



Deutsche
Beteiligungs AG

2025

Remuneration Report

Remuneration report

The remuneration report presents the structure and amount of remuneration paid to current and former members of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Beteiligungs AG (hereinafter referred to as “DBAG” or “the Company”) in the financial year 2025 (1 January to 31 December 2025).

This report also provides information on the multi-year variable remuneration granted to the Board of Management members for the short financial year from 1 October 2024 to 31 December 2024.

The report complies with the requirements set out in section 162 of the AktG. DBAG also follows the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), as amended on 28 April 2022, as per the Declaration of Compliance published in November 2025.

Board of Management remuneration

The remuneration system adopted by the Supervisory Board in its meeting on 20 December 2023 was applicable to the remuneration of the Board of Management members in the financial year 2025. The remuneration system was approved by the ordinary Annual General Meeting held on 27 May 2025 in accordance with section 120a (1) of the AktG.

The basic principles of the remuneration system are summarised below.

Basic principles of Board of Management remuneration and the underlying remuneration system

Total remuneration of the Board of Management consists of the following remuneration components:

- › a fixed salary;
- › one-year variable remuneration;
- › multi-year variable remuneration;

- › a bonus for DBAG’s Long-Term Investments, if applicable;
- › pension commitments, if applicable;
- › fringe benefits.

Out of the current Board of Management members, Jannick Hunecke may also receive follow-on remuneration from completed remuneration models.

The following table gives an overview of the remuneration system’s key components, the basic principles of their structure and their relevance for the Company’s long-term development, i.e. their link to DBAG’s strategy:

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Remuneration element	Structure	Link to strategy
Fixed remuneration elements		
Fixed remuneration	Disbursement in twelve monthly instalments	Ensuring adequate basic remuneration, avoiding incentives for taking unreasonable risks
Fringe benefits	Fringe benefits comprise a company car or a car allowance, insurance services (term life and accident insurance) and limited contributions to health and pension insurance. Total value limited to 10 per cent of the respective Board of Management member's fixed salary	Provision of market-standard fringe benefits, contributing to the retention of qualified Board of Management members
Pension scheme regulations	Defined direct commitment for Jannick Hunecke (vested rights); for all Board of Management members: payment of the employer's statutory social security contributions for BVV Versicherungsverein des Bankgewerbes a.G. (recognised as fringe benefits)	Securing an adequate pension as part of competitive remuneration
Variable remuneration elements		
One-year variable remuneration	Annual bonus disbursed in March of the following financial year Ascertained at reasonable discretion in terms of collective performance (weighting: 75 per cent) in the following performance criteria: › implementation of corporate strategy › development of net asset value and earnings from Fund Investment Services › implementation of ESG targets › share price performance and development of the Company's capital markets positioning Ascertained at reasonable discretion in terms of individual performance (weighting: 25 per cent) in the business segment the respective member is responsible for; disbursement limited to 40 per cent of the respective Board of Management member's fixed salary	Short-term variable remuneration element with performance incentives, in particular for operational key issues and strategic core topics
Multi-year variable remuneration	Annually determined long-term bonus with a three-year reference period Ascertained based on achievement of defined targets for two performance criteria: › average development of the net asset value (NAV), taking into consideration	Long-term remuneration element incentivising sustainable corporate success, measured by ambitious targets in the Private Markets Investments and Fund Investment Services segments

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Remuneration element	Structure	Link to strategy
	dividends and capital measures (weighting: 75 per cent) > average earnings before taxes in the Fund Investment Services segment (weighting: 25 per cent) Disbursement limited to 80 per cent of the respective Board of Management member's fixed salary	
Long-Term Investments bonus	Bonus for Board of Management members on the investment advisory team If DBAG has realised its invested capital plus a minimum return of eight per cent per annum, 15 per cent of the total performance achieved during a two-year investment period is paid out to members of the investment advisory team. As investment advisory team members, the Board of Management members receive a share; however, only if Deutsche Beteiligungs AG has received returns of capital. Disbursement limited to 65 per cent of the respective Board of Management member's annual fixed salary. In the event that this threshold is exceeded, the excess amount is "carried over" into the following financial year twice.	Additional incentive to successfully drive DBAG's Long-Term Investments
Other remuneration provisions		
Maximum remuneration	Maximum remuneration expenses per financial year and Board of Management member of 1,888,000 euros	Upper limit to avoid excessive remuneration
Penalty and clawback	DBAG can reduce variable remuneration (penalty) or even demand its repayment (clawback), in whole or in part respectively, if a member of the Board of Management commits certain serious breaches of duty.	Additional compliance responsibility element for the Board of Management
Share purchase obligation	Obligation of Board of Management members to invest at least 35 per cent of the net amount of the multi-year variable remuneration they are paid in any given year in DBAG shares; obligation to hold the shares so acquired for a minimum period of four years; no longer, however, than their service contract on the Board of Management	Increased alignment of Board of Management remuneration with shareholder interests

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Appropriateness of Board of Management remuneration

Criteria for the appropriateness of total remuneration levels are, in particular, the responsibilities of the respective Board of Management member, their personal performance, and the economic position, performance and prospects of DBAG. To that end, DBAG considers the structure and level of remuneration schemes common to the private equity industry which are required to attract and retain qualified key personnel, whilst also taking into account the structure and level of remuneration schemes of comparable listed SDAX companies and a peer group to assess the market conformity of Board of Management remuneration. To ensure the appropriateness of remuneration, the Supervisory Board regularly carries out both a horizontal and a vertical remuneration comparison.

Individual remuneration components

Fixed remuneration

The members of the Board of Management receive an annual fixed salary paid in twelve equal instalments. The fixed salary disbursed in the reporting period is set out in the tables below (section “Remuneration granted and owed to current Board of Management members”).

One-year variable remuneration

75 per cent of the one-year variable remuneration is based on the Board of Management’s overall performance and 25 per cent is based on the individual performance of the respective Board of Management member during the financial year under review. One-year variable remuneration may amount to up to 40 per cent of the fixed salary of the respective member of the Board of Management; it is paid out once a year, in March of the following financial year. If the Supervisory Board gives the performance of a Board of Management member a 100 per cent rating, the relevant member receives 80 per cent of the maximum one-year variable remuneration possible. A performance rating of up to 120 per cent may be assigned, resulting in the payment

of the maximum one-year variable remuneration possible. Where the performance rating is 80 per cent, the Board of Management member receives 60 per cent of the maximum one-year variable remuneration possible. If the performance rating is between 80 per cent and 100 per cent, or between 100 per cent and 120 per cent, the amount of the one-year variable remuneration to be paid must be ascertained in a linear manner. No one-year variable remuneration will be paid for a performance rating of less than 80 per cent.

After the end of the respective financial year, the Supervisory Board ascertains the overall performance of the Board of Management at its reasonable discretion, taking into consideration the following performance criteria:

- › implementation of corporate strategy;
- › short-term development of net asset value and earnings from Fund Investment Services;
- › implementation of ESG targets; and
- › share price performance and development of the Company’s capital markets positioning.

After the end of the respective financial year, the Supervisory Board ascertains the performance of individual members of the Board of Management at its reasonable discretion, using the performance of the business segment for which the respective member is responsible as a benchmark.

The Supervisory Board takes any compliance breaches or other breaches of duty on the part of the respective member of the Board of Management into consideration at its reasonable discretion; this may result in the one-year variable remuneration being reduced or, in the case of serious breaches, not being paid at all.

Along with the other variable remuneration elements, one-year variable remuneration is geared towards incentives for a long-term increase in the Company’s value by increasing the value of the Private Markets Investments and Fund Investment Services segments. The stipulated performance criteria allow for a balanced consideration of strategic key issues in the Company’s development, including consideration of sustainability criteria.

Performance assessment for the period under review

Following the end of the financial year ending 31 December 2025, the Supervisory Board assessed the Board of Management’s performance as a whole as well as that of individual members in the reporting year, based on the collective and individual targets defined by the Supervisory Board’s Executive Committee.

When assessing the Board of Management’s overall performance in the reporting period, the Supervisory Board placed particular emphasis on the NAV per share development and the successful transactions that were executed in a challenging market environment and found that the Board of Management’s overall target achievement was 90 per cent.

The Board of Management members’ individual performance in the reporting period was assessed based on the achievement of targets that the Supervisory Board had defined for each individual Board of Management member upon the recommendation of its Executive Committee. The Supervisory Board assigned an individual performance rating of 110 per cent to Tom Alzin and Jannick Hunecke and an individual performance rating of 100 per cent to Melanie Wiese.

For an overview of the Supervisory Board’s individual performance assessment, please refer to the following table (“One-year variable remuneration – overview of target achievement”).

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One-year variable remuneration – overview of target achievement			
Board of Management member	Joint Board of Management performance weighting: 75%	Individual Board of Management member performance weighting: 25%	Total performance in %
Tom Alzin	90	110	95
Jannick Hunecke	90	110	95
Melanie Wiese	90	100	93

The Supervisory Board was not (made) aware of any indications of compliance violations or other breaches of duty by the Board of Management members which would have given reason to reduce the one-year variable remuneration.

The Supervisory Board may also factor in extraordinary developments, as appropriate, when granting and disbursing variable remuneration components. There were no such exceptional developments in the reporting period.

For the amount of granted one-year variable remuneration disbursed for the reporting period, please refer to the tables below (“Remuneration granted and owed pursuant to section 162 (1) sentence 1 of the AktG – current Board of Management members”).

Multi-year variable remuneration

Multi-year variable remuneration stipulated in the current remuneration system for the Board of Management is based on the following two criteria: (i) average development of the net asset value (NAV) generated in the Private Markets Investments business segment plus dividends distributed, and adjusted in the event of capital measures such as capital increases or share buybacks (hereinafter referred to as “NAV growth rate”) and (ii) earnings before taxes of the Fund Investment Services business segment (hereinafter referred to as “earnings from Fund Investment Services”). A three-year reference period is decisive for the fulfilment of both criteria. Target achievement is measured based on the targets for both criteria determined by the Supervisory

Board at the beginning of each three-year period. 75 per cent of the multi-year variable remuneration is based on the NAV growth rate criterion and 25 per cent is based on the earnings from Fund Investment Services criterion. Multi-year variable remuneration may amount to up to 80 per cent of the respective Board of Management member’s fixed salary.

The Supervisory Board takes any compliance breaches or other breaches of duty on the part of the respective member of the Board of Management into consideration at its reasonable discretion; this may result in the multi-year variable remuneration being reduced or, in the case of serious breaches, not being paid at all.

Multi-year variable remuneration offers specific incentives for increasing the Company’s long-term success in the two segments Private Markets Investments and Fund Investment Services, always keeping in mind the overarching strategic objective of a long-term increase in the Company’s value.

Multi-year variable remuneration is paid out annually, within the first four months after the end of the financial year. If a Board of Management service contract commences during the course of the year, the relevant member of the Board of Management will be paid the multi-year variable remuneration for the respective financial year pro rata temporis. If a Board of Management member leaves the Company during the course of the year, they will be paid no multi-year variable remuneration for that year.

The Supervisory Board had defined the targets set out below for the two performance criteria “NAV growth rate” and “Fund Investment Services EBT” (earnings before taxes) in November 2022. Target definition was based on the Company’s medium-term planning.

As DBAG changed its financial year to match the calendar year and established a short financial year 2024, the remuneration system de-

termines that targets that have already been set for multi-year variable remuneration are adjusted to the effect that, instead of the period ending on 30 September of the respective year, the period ending on 31 December of the respective year (i.e. the end of the new financial year) is used as a reference period.

The relevant target definition for the NAV growth rate in the financial year 2025 is as follows:

CAGR NAV (3-year average)	Multiplier for 75% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration	Target achievement rate
11.9 % or lower	0,00	0%
12.0-12.9%	0.48	80%
13.0-13.9%	0.56	85%
14.0-14.9%	0.64	90%
15.0-15.9%	0.72	95%
16.0-16.9%	0.80	100%
17.0-17.9%	0.90	110%
18.0% of higher	1	120%

The relevant target definition for the Fund Investment Services EBT in the financial year 2025 is as follows:

Earnings from Fund Investment Services €mn (3-year average)	Multiplier for 25% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration	Target achievement rate
5.9 or lower	0.0	0%
6.0 – 7.9	0.4	75%
8.0 – 9.9	0.6	87,5%
10.0 – 11.9	0.8	100%
12.0 or higher	1.0	120%

The following figures were calculated for the NAV growth rate performance criterion in the reference period:

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NAV growth rate in the reference period	
€m	
NAV 2021/2022	573.7
NAV 2022/2023	669.4
NAV 2023/2024	688.4
NAV SFY 2024	649.7
NAV 2025 (adjusted) ¹	722.8
Growth rate (3-year average)	7.37%
Multiplier for 75% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration ²	0

1 As at the reporting date, adjusted for dividends distributed and capital measures (capital increases and share buybacks)
2 Multiplier according to target definition for the reference period.

The following figures were calculated for the Fund Investment Services EBT performance criterion in the reference period:

Fund Investment Services EBT in the reference period	
€m	
Fund Investment Services EBT in 2022/2023	14
Fund Investment Services EBT in 2023/2024	13.5
Fund Investment Services EBT in FY 2025	10.3
Fund Investment Services EBT (3-year average)	12.6
Multiplier for 25% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration ¹	1

1 Multiplier according to target definition for the reference period.

The Supervisory Board was not (made) aware of any indications of compliance violations or other breaches of duty by the Board of Management members which would have given reason to reduce the multi-year variable remuneration.

In line with the aforementioned provisions on multi-year variable remuneration, the disbursement amounts for the current Board of Management members are as set out below.

Disbursement amount – Multi-year variable remuneration for the financial year 2025			
	Tom Alzin	Jannick Hunecke	Melanie Wiese
75% of the maximum amount (€'000)	330	330	240
NAV multiple	0	0	0
25% of the maximum amount (€'000)	110	110	80
Fund Investment Services EBT multiple	1	1	1
Total disbursement amount (€'000)	110	110	80

Long-Term Investments bonus

The members of the Board of Management who are also members of the investment advisory team may also receive a bonus for the success of DBAG's Long-Term Investments. This bonus takes into account the performance of Long-Term Investments from two successive financial years ("investment period"). The entitlement to the bonus arises only if DBAG has realised its invested capital plus a minimum return of eight per cent per annum ("internal rate of return"). If this requirement is met, 15 per cent of the total performance achieved in the investment period concerned is paid out to members of the investment advisory team. Those Board of Management members who are also members of the investment advisory team will receive a specific portion of this amount. Payment will only be made once the capital inflows have been received by DBAG.

Remuneration paid from the Long-Term Investments bonus is capped at 65 per cent of the annual fixed salary of the respective Board of Management member. If this threshold is exceeded, the excess amount is not paid out until the next financial year. This "carry-over" arrangement can only be applied twice for each entitlement. Payments made from the Long-Term Investments bonus can also be paid after the Board of Management member's service contract has been terminated, although they remain subject to the cap limiting them to 65 per cent of the member's (final) fixed salary.

The Long-Term Investments bonus sets targeted incentives for a successful development of DBAG's portfolio of Long-Term Investments which – in addition to the investments entered into alongside the DBAG funds – are an element of DBAG's investment strategy.

None of the Board of Management members received a Long-Term Investments bonus in the reporting period.

Follow-on variable remuneration from legacy remuneration models

Jannick Hunecke may also receive follow-on variable remuneration components from legacy remuneration models for members of the investment advisory team.

All follow-on variable remuneration from legacy remuneration models considers particularly the long-term measurement of investment success, contributing to the Company's long-term development.

- › Bonus on return on equity: the profit-sharing scheme for investments entered into up to 31 December 2000 is geared to DBAG's return on equity. Profit-sharing awards are only granted if the return on equity for the reporting period has reached a level of 15 per cent before taxes and bonuses. The computation base of equity relates exclusively to these investments. No entitlements resulted from this remuneration model in the financial year 2025.
- › TP2001 bonus: for investments that were made between 2001 and 2006, profit-sharing starts from a minimum return on investment of eight per cent per year after imputed costs of two per cent. They are paid exclusively from realised profits. Two-thirds of these entitlements are paid after the close of the respective financial year. Entitlement to the remaining one-third is subject to a final review after the disinvestment phase of all investments involved has been completed, and is paid out in the amount of

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the remaining final entitlement. No entitlements resulted from this remuneration model in the financial year 2025.

Please refer to the condensed disclosures, in the section on remuneration granted and owed to former Board of Management members, for specific follow-on variable remuneration due to former Board of Management members who retired from the Board of Management in a financial year that goes back more than ten years.

Pension commitments

The pension schemes initially offered by DBAG have been closed to new members since 2 January 2001 (pension commitment) and since the beginning of the 2004/2005 financial year (contribution plan). To the extent that a Board of Management member had received pension commitments from DBAG before they became part of the Board of Management, whether in the form of an undertaking for a specific annual pension or in the form of annual contributions to a pension scheme, these will be continued.

Jannick Hunecke’s service contract stipulates that the pension commitments granted by the Company in form of a defined direct commitment before his appointment to the Board of Management remain valid; however, they are fixed in the amount realised when Jannick Hunecke commenced his Board of Management activity. No additional contributions to pension commitments and/or increases in Jannick Hunecke’s benefit entitlements will occur. The present value of this pension obligation was 1,077,000 euros as at 31 December 2025 (previous year: 1,069,000 euros).

Neither Tom Alzin nor Melanie Wiese have received any pension commitments.

All Board of Management members are insured via BVV Versicherungsverein des Bankgewerbes a.G., with Deutsche Beteiligungs AG

paying the employer’s statutory social security contributions (recognised as a fringe benefit).

Fringe benefits

Members of the Board of Management may receive the following fringe benefits:

- › company car, which may also be used for private purposes, or a car allowance;
- › smartphone, which may also be used for private purposes;
- › accident insurance cover;
- › term life insurance cover;
- › statutory or private health insurance premiums;
- › private pension insurance scheme contributions in line with the contributions that would be payable to a statutory pension plan if the respective member of the Board of Management was subject to an insurance obligation under statutory pension plans;
- › payment for the costs of one comprehensive health check per year; and
- › payment for the costs of participating in corporate talks and similar networking and business development initiatives.

The fringe benefits granted essentially consist of private pension insurance scheme contributions in line with the contributions that would be payable to a statutory pension plan if the respective member of the Board of Management was subject to an insurance obligation under statutory pension plans, statutory or private health insurance premiums, and a car allowance. The employer’s social security contribution to the mentioned insurance via BVV Versicherungsverein des Bankgewerbes

a.G. is also recognised as a fringe benefit. The aggregate value of fringe benefits per financial year is limited to a maximum of ten per cent of the fixed salary of the particular member of the Board of Management.

The amount of fringe benefits granted to the individual members in the reporting period is set out in the table below (section “Remuneration granted and owed to current Board of Management members”). Fringe benefits are considered with their costs or in the amount of their non-cash benefits. Members attended the annual corporate talk during the period under review.

Adherence to maximum remuneration

The remuneration paid for any single financial year is made up of the fixed salary, the one-year variable remuneration, the multi-year variable remuneration and, if applicable, the Long-Term Investments bonus, pension commitment and any fringe benefits. It is capped at a maximum amount of 1,888,000 euros gross per member of the Board of Management. The calculation assigns any payment of the variable remuneration to the financial year preceding the year in which the payment is made. Any follow-on variable remuneration payments under remuneration models completed in the past are also taken into account. The determination of the amount of the pension commitment is based on the pension service costs of the respective financial year, both for fixing the target total remuneration and the maximum remuneration.

Maximum remuneration was complied with during the period under review. Please refer to the following table for an overview of remuneration granted to the Board of Management members in office during 2025.

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Adherence to maximum remuneration			
€'000	Tom Alzin	Jannick Hunecke	Melanie Wiese
Fixed remuneration			
Fixed salary	550	550	400
Fringe benefits	37	41	37
Pension service costs	0	0	0
Variable remuneration			
One-year variable remuneration ¹	165	165	116
Multi-year variable remuneration ¹	110	110	80
Long-Term Investments bonus	0	0	0
Follow on variable remuneration from legacy remuneration models	0	0	0
Total remuneration	862	866	633
Maximum remuneration	1,888	1,888	1,888

1 Disbursed after the end of the reporting period.

Penalty and clawback (reclaim or reduction of variable remuneration)

In line with provisions stipulated in the service contracts, the Supervisory Board can reclaim (clawback) or withhold (penalty) the one-year variable remuneration and/or the multi-year variable remuneration, in whole or in part, if the respective member of the Board of Management commits a serious breach of duty; this clawback or penalty relates to the remuneration paid for the year during which the serious breach of duty occurred. A clawback may also be asserted after the relevant Board of Management member has left the Company.

The Supervisory Board did not make use of the option to claw back any variable remuneration components in the period under review, since no events occurred which would have given reason to do so.

Obligation to invest in Company shares

The members of the Board of Management are obliged to invest at least 35 per cent of the net amount of the multi-year variable remuneration they are paid in any given year in DBAG shares. The Board of Management members are obliged to hold the shares so acquired for a minimum period of four years; no longer, however, than their service contract on the Board of Management. The DBAG shares must be acquired within six months following payment of the respective multi-year variable remuneration. However, the shares may only be acquired at a time when their acquisition is permissible under insider trading rules and in compliance with DBAG’s internal guidelines.

The current Board of Management members acquired DBAG shares in the amount set out below in the reporting period. The investment targets of 35 per cent of the net amount of the multi-year variable remuneration paid in the reporting period were reached or exceeded:

Share purchases by current Board of Management members in the reporting year			
€'000	Tom Alzin	Jannick Hunecke	Melanie Wiese
Purchase volume DBAG shares ¹ 2025	9	9	0

1 Volume of DBAG share purchases in the period under review (acquisition cost less ancillary acquisition cost).

Further provisions concerning the termination of Board of Management mandates

Board of Management service contracts are usually entered into for a term of three to five years. The Supervisory Board may depart from this approach, if warranted, in individual cases. Where a Board of Management service contract is terminated early, any payments to the relevant Board of Management member are contractually limited to twice the annual remuneration (including fringe benefits) and must not exceed the remuneration for the residual term of the Board of Man-

agement service contract that would have been owed had the contract not been terminated early. The payment of outstanding variable remuneration components, which are attributable to the period until contract termination, is based on the originally agreed targets and comparison parameters, also in the case of early termination, and takes place at the agreed due dates.

Remuneration granted and owed to current Board of Management members

The following table provides an overview of remuneration “granted and owed” to current Board of Management members, including the relative share of each remuneration component pursuant to section 162 (1) sentence 1, sentence 2 no. 1 of the AktG for the financial year 2025.

Accordingly, the overview comprises all remuneration components paid to the Board of Management members in the reporting period (granted remuneration) and all remuneration components legally due but not yet paid (owed remuneration).

One-year variable remuneration and multi-year variable remuneration for the performance during the reporting period is disbursed after the close of the reporting period. It is reported in the table below as the underlying activity was performed in full in the reporting period which is why the remuneration is owed. The table also shows any remuneration owed in form of the Long-Term Investments bonus, the bonus on return on equity and the TP2001 bonus in the reporting period.

The relative shares of the individual remuneration elements are shown as percentages of granted and owed total remuneration. The remuneration shares are thus not identical to remuneration shares from the remuneration system on which target total remuneration is based. To the extent that members of the Board of Management receive remuneration for executive offices held in portfolio companies, this is transferred to DBAG. Remuneration for executive functions in other

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companies or institutions may remain with the respective member of the Board of Management upon approval by the Supervisory Board.

The current members of the Board of Management were neither promised nor granted remuneration for activities as board of management members by a third party in the period under review.

Granted and owed remuneration pursuant to section 162 (1) sentence 1 of the AktG – Current Board of Management members¹

	Tom Alzin				Jannick Hunecke				Melanie Wiese			
	Spokesman of the Board of Management				Member of the Board of Management				Member of the Board of Management			
	2025		SFY 2024		2025		SFY 2024		2025		SFY 2024	
	4 quarters		1 quarter		4 quarters		1 quarter		4 quarters		1 quarter	
	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)
Fixed remuneration	550	64%	138	70%	550	64%	138	71%	400	63%	100	77%
Fringe benefits	37	4%	11	6%	41	5%	10	5%	37	6%	10	8%
Total	587	68%	149	76%	591	69%	148	76%	437	69%	110	85%
One-year variable remuneration	165	19%	0	0%	165	19%	0	0%	116	18%	0	0%
Multi-year variable remuneration	110	13%	28	14%	110	13%	28	14%	80	13%	20	15%
Long-Term Investments bonus	0	0%	20	10%	0	0%	20	10%	0	0%	0	0%
“Bonus on return on equity”	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
“TP2001 bonus”	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total remuneration pursuant to section 162 of the AktG	862	100%	197	100%	866	100%	196	100%	633	100%	130	100%

1 Percentages may not always amount to 100 per cent due to rounding.

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Multi-year variable remuneration for Board of Management members in the short financial year from 1 October 2024 to 31 December 2024

The following section provides an overview of multi-year variable remuneration granted to the Board of Management members for the short financial year from 1 October 2024 to 31 December 2024. Multi-year variable remuneration for the short financial year was determined as if the financial year had lasted from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 – subject to a pro-rata payout of one-quarter of the resulting amount. The payment was made in December 2025.

The Supervisory Board had defined the targets set out below for the two performance criteria “NAV growth rate” and “Fund Investment Services EBT” (earnings before taxes) in November 2022. Target definition was based on the Company’s medium-term planning.

Target definition for the NAV growth rate:

CAGR NAV (3-year average)	Multiplier for 75% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration	Target achievement rate
11.9 % or lower	0.00	0%
12.0-12.9%	0.48	80%
13.0-13.9%	0.56	85%
14.0-14.9%	0.64	90%
15.0-15.9%	0.72	95%
16.0-16.9%	0.80	100%
17.0-17.9%	0.90	110%
18.0% of higher	1.00	120%

Target definition for Fund Investment Services EBT:

Earnings from Fund Investment Services €mn (3-year average)	Multiplier for 25% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration	Target achievement rate
5.9 or lower	0.0	0%
6.0 – 7.9	0.4	75%
8.0 – 9.9	0.6	87,5%
10.0 – 11.9	0.8	100%
12.0 or higher	1.0	120%

The following figures were calculated for the NAV growth rate performance criterion in the reference period:

NAV growth rate in the reference period SFY 2024	
€m	
NAV 2021/2022	573.7
NAV 2022/2023	669.4
NAV 2023/2024	688.4
NAV 30 Sep 2025 (adjusted) ¹	709.3
Growth rate (3-year average)	7.33%
Multiplier for 75% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration ²	0

- 1 As at the reporting date, adjusted for dividends distributed, capital measures and share buybacks in the reference period.
- 2 Multiplier according to target definition for the reference period.

The following figures were calculated for the Fund Investment Services EBT performance criterion in the reference period:

Fund Investment Services EBT in the reference period SFY 2024	
€m	
Fund Investment Services EBT in 2022/2023	14.0
Fund Investment Services EBT in 2023/2024	12.8
Fund Investment Services EBT in 2024/2025	12.2
Fund Investment Services EBT (3-year average)	13.0
Multiplier for 25% of the maximum amount of the multi-year variable remuneration ¹	1

- 1 Determined as if the financial year had lasted from 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025 – pro-rata payout of one-quarter.
- 2 Multiplier according to target definition for the reference period.

The Supervisory Board was not (made) aware of any indications of compliance violations or other breaches of duty by the Board of Management members which would have given reason to reduce the multi-year variable remuneration.

In line with the aforementioned provisions on multi-year variable remuneration, the disbursement amounts for the Board of Management members in office during the short financial year 2024 are as set out below.

Disbursement amount – Multi-year variable remuneration for the short financial year 2024			
	Tom Alzin	Jannick Hunecke	Melanie Wiese
75% of the maximum amount (€'000)	82.5	82.5	60.0
NAV multiple	0	0	0
25% of the maximum amount (€'000)	27.5	27.5	20.0
Fund Investment Services EBT multiple	1	1	1
Total disbursement amount (€'000)	27.5	27.5	20.0

Remuneration report

Remuneration granted and owed to former Board of Management members

Pursuant to section 162 (5) of the AktG, no personal details are provided for former members of the Board of Management who left prior to 31 December 2015.

The present value of pension obligations for former Board of Management members and their surviving dependants amounted to 17,558,000 euros at the reporting date (previous year: 18,238,000 euros).

Supervisory Board remuneration

Basic principles of Supervisory Board remuneration

Remuneration granted and owed to Supervisory Board members in the period under review was determined by a resolution adopted by the Annual General Meeting on 27 May 2025.

The remuneration paid consists of two components: an annual fixed remuneration of 75,000 euros (base remuneration) and additional disbursements to the Chair and for committee membership (additional remuneration). The Chair of the Supervisory Board receives a maximum of twice the base remuneration, irrespective of their membership on various committees. The Chair of the Audit Committee receives an additional fixed annual remuneration of 25,000 euros; all other Audit Committee members receive an additional fixed annual remuneration of 10,000 euros. The Chair of the Executive Committee receives an additional fixed annual remuneration of 15,000 euros, all the other members of the Executive Committee receive an additional fixed annual remuneration of 5,000 euros.

Supervisory Board remuneration takes into consideration the specific functions and responsibilities of the individual Supervisory Board members. In particular, the greater time commitment of the Chair of the

Supervisory Board, the Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board, and the Chairs and members of the committees, is taken into account in an appropriate manner. The remuneration structure follows the GCGC recommendations. To ensure the Supervisory Board’s unrestricted control and advisory function there is no intention to grant variable remuneration to the Board.

Remuneration shall be paid at the end of the respective financial year. Supervisory Board members who only belong to the Supervisory Board or a committee during a part of the financial year, or who are Chair or Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board or Chair of the Audit Committee during a part of the financial year, shall receive lower remuneration, proportional to the time spent in office.

Supervisory Board remuneration in the reporting period was fully in line with the provisions defined above. As no remuneration clawback options are in place, there were no instances of clawback.

Remuneration report

Remuneration granted and owed to Supervisory Board members

The following table provides an overview of remuneration granted and owed to the respective Supervisory Board members in the past financial year 2025, including the relative share of each remuneration component pursuant to section 162 (1) sentence 1, sentence 2 no. 1 of the AktG. The table states the disbursed remuneration even if payment is made after the end of the reporting period.

Individual presentation of remuneration granted and owed (Supervisory Board) ¹					
Member of the Supervisory Board (position)	Base remuneration		Additional remuneration		Total
	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)	€'000
Dr Hendrik Otto (Chairman)	75.0	50	75.0	50	150.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	15.0	50	15.0	50	30.0
Prof. Dr Kai C. Andrejewski (Vice Chairman)	75.0	71	30.0	29	105.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	15.0	67	7.5	33	22.5
Axel Holtrup	75.0	100	0.0	0	75.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	15.0	100	0.0	0	15.0
Dr Kathrin Köhling	75.0	88	10.0	12	85.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	15.0	80	3.8	20	18.8
Dr Jörg Wulfken	75.0	94	5.0	6	80.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	15.0	67	7.5	33	22.5
Dr Maximilian Zimmerer	75.0	100	0.0	0	75.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	15.0	100	0.0	0	15.0
Total remuneration	450.0	79	120.0	21	570.0
Previous year (SFY 2024)	90.0	73	33.8	27	123.8

1 Percentages may not always amount to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Remuneration report

Comparison of remuneration and earnings development

The following section comprises “a presentation allowing comparisons to be made” pursuant to section 162 (1) sentence 2 no. 2 of the AktG of the annual change in remuneration granted to the Board of Management and Supervisory Board members, of the performance of the Company, and of the annual change in average remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of employees of the Company over the five most recent (short) financial years (also known as a vertical comparison).

The comparison shows the remuneration granted and owed to current and former members of the Board of Management and Supervisory Board in the respective financial year or short financial year, to the extent that the individuals received remuneration in the period under review. To present the performance, DBAG has not only used the Company’s net income/loss (as legally required), but also the development of net asset value and earnings from Fund Investment Services, both of which are also used to measure multi-year variable remuneration under the new remuneration system.

Reported average employee remuneration (excluding members of the corporate bodies and committees, interns, working students and train-

ees) on a full-time equivalent basis is based on personnel expenses for wages and salaries, including wage tax, employer contributions to social security, fringe benefits and variable remuneration components for DBAG’s entire workforce.

The percentage changes compared to the short financial year 2024 offer only very limited informative value; as such, they should not be understood as a corresponding change in remuneration or a corresponding earnings development.

Remuneration report

	2025	SFY 2024	Change 2025 - SFY 2024	2023/2024	Change SFY 2024 - 2023/2024	2022/2023	Change 2023/2024 - 2022/2023
	4 quarters	1 quarter		4 quarters		4 quarters	
	€'000	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)	€'000	(%)
I. Board of Management members (serving in 2025)							
Tom Alzin (Spokesman of the Board of Management since 1 March 2023; Member of the Board of Management since 1 March 2021)	862	197	338	1,168	(83)	968	21
Jannick Hunecke (since 1 March 2021)	866	196	342	1,169	(83)	955	22
Melanie Wiese (since 1 January 2023)	633	130	387	645	(80)	-	-
II. Former Board of Management members							
Torsten Grede (until 28 February 2023)	0	0	0	683	(100)	980	(30)
Dr Rolf Scheffels (until 28 February 2021)	0.0	0	0	2	(100)	8	(75)
III. Supervisory Board remuneration							
Dr Hendrik Otto (Chairman)	150	30	400	120	(75)	120	0
Prof Dr Kai C. Andrejewski (Vice Chairman)	105	23	357	63	-	63	-
Axel Holtrup	75	15	400	60	(75)	60	0
Dr Kathrin Köhling	85	19	347	0	-	0	-
Dr Jörg Wulfken	80	23	248	90	(74)	90	0
Dr Maximilian Zimmerer	75	15	400	66	(77)	60	10
IV. Earnings performance							
Net asset value	639,667	649,702	(2)	669,379	(3)	573,707	16.7
Earnings from Fund Investment Services	10,292	4,072	153	14,046	(71)	15,377	(22)
Net income (HGB)	(24,905)	3,767	(761)	54,587	(93)	744	>100,0
V. Average employee remuneration							
Average remuneration	259	70	270	259	(73)	217	19

Report of the independent auditor on the audit of the remuneration report pursuant to section 162 (3) of the AktG

To Deutsche Beteiligungs AG,
Frankfurt/Main

Audit opinion

We have formally audited the remuneration report of Deutsche Beteiligungs AG , Frankfurt am Main , for the financial year from 1. January 2025 to 31. December 2025 as to whether the disclosures pursuant to Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with § 162 Abs. 3 AktG, we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the accompanying remuneration report includes, in all material respects, the disclosures required by section 162 (1) and (2) AktG. Our audit opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report
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Basis for the audit opinion

We conducted our audit of the remuneration report in accordance with § 162 Abs. 3 AktG and the IDW Auditing Standard: The Audit of the Remuneration Report in Accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG (IDW PS 870 (09.2025)). Our responsibilities under those requirements and this standard are further described in the "Auditor's Responsibilities" section of our report. As an audit firm, we have applied the requirements

of the IDW quality management standards. We have complied with the professional requirements of the German Public Auditors' Code and the Pro-fessional Code for Public Auditors and Chartered Accountants, including the independence re-quirements.

Responsibilities of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board

The Management Board and the Supervisory Board are responsible for the preparation of the re-muneration report, including the related disclosures, in accordance with the requirements of Section 162 AktG. They are also responsible for such internal control as they determine is nec-essary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report that is free from material misstate-ment, whether due to fraud or error.

Responsibility of the auditor

Our objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the remuneration report includes, in all material respects, the disclosures required by section 162 (1) and (2) AktG and to issue an auditor's report thereon.

We planned and performed our audit such that we can determine the formal completeness of the remuneration report by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required by section 162 (1) and (2) AktG. In accordance with § 162 Abs. 3 AktG, we have not audited the content of the disclosures, the completeness of the individual disclosures or the fair presentation of the remuneration report.

Dealing with any misleading representations

In connection with our audit, our responsibility is to read the remuneration report in the light of our knowledge obtained in the audit and, in doing so, to consider whether the remuneration re-port includes mis-representations with regard to the accuracy of the content of the information, the completeness of the content of the individual disclo-sures or the fair presentation of the re-muneration report.

If, based on the work we have performed, we conclude that such misrepresentation exists, we are required to report that fact.

Frankfurt/Main, 9 March 2026

BDO AG
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft


Dr Faßhauer


Gebhardt